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The grain mirage: 
ideal and reality in early Wellington agriculture 
BRAD PATfERSON 
THE: Focus oF MY PRESE:NT research, or rather writing, is a 
study of the dynamics of 'settler capitalism' in the south-
em North Island districts, from the beginnings of Euro-
pean settlement to about 1876. Within that framework I 
am endeavouring to probe the evolution of socio-eco-
nomic, and by extension political, elites in this one small 
part of that hegemony that was the nineteenth-century 
British Empire, formal and informal. A particular concern 
is with the accumulation of colonial wealth: by whom, how 
much, by what means? That said, however, there is 
interest in the losers, as well as winners. The organising 
theme is embodied in the present working title: Wakefield, 
Wool and Waste Lands. If it is accepted that the European 
settlers came with overtly capitalistic objectives in mind 
(and only the very naive, surely, could now ascribe purely 
altruistic motives to the founders) the title nicely sums up 
the message. Capitalist exploitation of the southern North 
Island commenced replete with an organising ideology. 
Hence Wakefield, or more properly, Wakefieldism. Just 
how pervasive that ideology was is still not fully appreci-
ated. What is generally recognised is that it was found 
wanting as a basis for colonial development. Alternative 
capitalist strategies therefore had to be devised. This is 
where wool comes in, even if it seems likely that the most 
successful accumulators of all were town merchants. The 
means of achievement, in all cases, however, was the one 
natural resource that all of the New Zealand settlements 
were believed to possess in relative abundance - land. 
'Waste lands' derives from the notion that unless lands 
were occupied, and utilised, they were essentially there for 
selection and/or purchase by Europeans, at any rate 
appropriation, whatever the complexities of customary 
tenure. 
In an earlier Stout series I discussed the origins of 
pastoralism in the southern North Island districts to 
about the mid 1850s. At that stage the inevitability of an 
early switch to sheepfarming as the primary export pro-
ducing activity of the settlement was suggested. It is now 
intended to take the argument back one step, and to 
demonstrate why a preference for extensive grazing was 
inevitable. The immediate concern is with how land was 
utilised, or rather how it might be utilised. This was a 
lively matter of debate at Wellington right to the mid 
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1850s, even if by that point the way to the future was 
becoming clearer. By that date a settlement conceived as 
agriculturally based was already well on the way to 
becoming one with a rural economy dominated by large 
sheepruns. Yet the uncertainty which had marked the 
first efforts to wring returns from the breaking of soil was 
in striking contrast to the assurance with which the 
colonising enterprise had been launched. At the outset, 
prospective settlers, of all classes, had embarked with a 
vision. It was one of a prosperous arable future. It was one 
in which the landscape would be transformed into a neat 
chequerboard of waving wheat stalks. It was one in which 
grains and flour would amass at the wharves awaiting 
shipment to a range of overseas destinations. Above all, it 
was one in which control would be entrusted to a small 
group of major landowners, they providing the capital for 
property development, and employment for lesser set-
tlers. At Port Nicholson, however, intensive agriculture 
had inauspicious beginnings, being characterised more 
by chaos than by concerted attempts to test crops or 
growing conditions. There was the initial problem of 
confronting an alien environment. Ignorance of appropri-
ate agricultural practice, inadequate planning and rela-
tive isolation from more developed agricultural settle-
ments were all additional constraints; and they were 
magnified by excessive optimism prior to arrival. Once 
these obstacles were overcome they were supplanted by 
new ones, by acute shortages of capital and labour, by 
highly variable demand, and by marked price fluctua-
tions. And, in the background, a lways present, were the 
difficulties imposed by the New Zealand Company's land 
distribution system. The greatest check was the complete 
unsuitability of much of the first settled land surface for 
cultivation; but this handicap was exacerbated by pro-
moter decisions. At first land shortage was absolute, 
settlers arriving before the rural sections had been laid 
out. Then the deficiency was one of suitable lands, better 
cultivation sites being passed over for lands nearer the 
harbour. Finally it was the availability of land in lots of a 
size appropriate for the forms of agriculture which had 
taken root. Whatever, 'coming to terms' was a s low and 
painful process, but by the mid 1850s there was majority 
agreement that the vision of a grain based economy had 
been no more than a mirage. And there was another, and 
more fundamental , realisation: large fortunes could not be 
made from the forms of intensive agriculture that were 
possible. 
THE IDEAL: 'CoRN CRAMMED PARALLELOGRAMS, NEAT 
HEDGEROWS AND TRIM COUNTRY SEATS' 
What, then, were the origins of the la unching Vision. For 
this itis necessary to go back to Britain, to Edward Gibbon 
Wakefield, to his writings, and to the sources and experi-
ences upon which he drew. That the settlement would 
draw its economic strength from tillage had been a con-
sistent tenet of Wakefield's theorising. His idea of a 
prosperous colony was one in which agriculture was 
practised on a large and extending scale; one where arable 
continually displaced the grazing of sheep and cattle. 
Grazing, other than in a regulated mixed farm format, 
should never be more than a short term expedient. Nor 
was Wakefield in any doubt as to the preferred products: 
grain, grain and grain; though he was also prepared to 
countenance Vines and olive culture. New Zealand, he 
argued, was ideally situated to become the 'granary of the 
Pacific'. eventually the supplier of cheap corn to British 
markets. On its extensive fertile plains, or so he wrote, 
wheat simply scattered on the ground, left without care, 
would flourish beneath the 'happy skies'. As actual forma-
tion of the settlement came nearer, optimistic phrases 
continued to flow from Wakefield's pen, and from those of 
his associates. Yet, nothing was to be left to chance. To 
ensure that the planned ploughing, and subsequent sow-
ing and reaping, were appropriately prosecuted, the theo-
rist set out a full prescription as to how agriculture should 
be organised. What he sought was some idealised replica-
tion ofthe economic, social, and not least spatial, arrange-
ments of the farming districts with which he was most 
familiar - the agricultural counties of south eastern Eng-
land. 
The foundations forWakefield's enthusiasm for arable 
were a mix of the apparently pragmatic and his deepseated 
desire to foster an elitist social order. The latter will be 
dealt with presently, but of the need to augment Britain's 
grain supplies there can be no doubt. In the preceding 100 
years Britain had been transformed from a net grain 
exporter to a net grain importer. Although agricultural 
productivity had been greatly enhanced over the same 
period, British population growth had outstripped the 
domestic sector's capacity to supply. By this time the 
greatest demand was for wheat. This, in itself, owed much 
to the contemporaneous restructuring of the British 
economy. As late as 1800 wheat had been the dominant 
food grain in the south of England only, but in the next 
four decades there was a trend towards a nationally 
uniform pattern of cereal eating based on the wheaten 
Agricultural divisions of England and Wales: after James 
Caird 1850-51. 
loaf. To some extent this reflected upwards trending real 
incomes, wheat having previously been reserved for more 
genteel tables, but it also reflected the increasing urbani-
sation of the British population, towns being crucibles for 
imitative changes in tastes. What then had to be faced was 
that Britain was not an optimal grain-growing location. 
Beyond the limits imposed by finite land resources, wheat 
was never an easy crop to grow, even on well managed 
farms. Appropriate soil conditions were limited, and cli-
matic fluctuations had the potential to blast production in 
otherwise favourable districts. Primafacie, then, a case 
could be made for grain growing in British overseas 
possessions, both to supply the home market, and, no less 
Vitally, subsidiary markets in other British colonies. And 
the Corn Laws lent the notion added attraction. But there 
were several provisos. The promotion of this specialised 
agriculture would only be viable if suitable grain growing 
lands could be located, if the lands could rapidly be 
brought into production at relatively low cost, and if the 
colonial produce could be cost-effectively conveyed to 
primary markets. These were important provisos, as shall 
be demonstrated. 
Though much ofWakefield's prescription amounted to 
a fond looking back to Britain's pre-industrial past, his 
agricultural model, intriguingly, was very much the prod-
uct of more recent developments. Recent research lessens 
the case for a classic 'Agricultural Revolution', but there 
can be no questioning there h ad been considerable up-
heaval in British agriculture in the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries. In the place of traditional all-
purpose mixed crop/livestock farming, something char-
acterising British farming for a millennium, there were by 
/ Corn growmg·to east ·· 
Grazing to west 
; ·· High waQes to no"rth 
• • Low wages · to south 
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the 1830s clear regional d ivisions, most distinctively 
between the grazing west and the arable east, and between 
the high rural wage north and the low wage south. (Fig. 1) 
Wakefield's preference for the south eastern England 
model reflected both his preference for arable, and his 
conviction that intensive agrtculture held the best pros-
pects for excess population absorption . There were, how-
ever, several critical oversights. First was that, while the 
south eastern counties were indisputably corn-growing, 
they were never exclusively so. The form of agiiculture was 
a mixed farming valiant. To be sure, arable crops had 
piimacy, but with stock fattening an important subsidi-
ary. In words of one commentator, it was 'an elegant 
interlocking system'. Second was that the south eastern 
counties largely extended their lead in British corn pro-
duction between 1814 and 1840 through new methods 
and expensive new inputs. Soil improvement provides one 
example. The depletion through generations of cropping 
was addressed not just through animal manure, but also 
through topdressings of ground bones and ash, spreadings 
ofmarl and lime. Applications of compost were important 
in several counties. Field drainage was a natural exten-
sion to this activity. Allied to soil improvement were more 
than 100,000, Wakefield's preoccupation was with those 
towards the lower end of the scale. His suggestive empha-
sis was on units occupied by the 'landed gentry', and by 
more recent emulators, those ranging from under 1000 to 
around 10,000 acres. That there might be some discrep-
ancy between these already developed properties of around 
1 000 acres plus and slices of colonial wilderness sold off 
in 100 acre parcels was never addressed. Nor was the 
question of the sources of capital for colonial farm devel-
opment. Nevertheless, Wakefield's preoccupation with the 
landed gentry as role models for an Antipodean Squirear-
chy was understandable, if scarcely more realistic. Corn: 
monly the gentry were men of substance, men well fitted 
to afford the type ofteadership considered appropriate for 
an agrtcultural settlement. What he down-played was that 
the landowners- his agricultural capitalists- were but one 
part, if a ciitical part, of a structured multi-tier agrarian 
relationship. Few Biitish landowners, for example, were 
themselves practical farmers. They were concerned with 
overall decision-making and general administration. The 
actual supervision of farming on Biitish estates was the 
prerogative of land stewards, or bailiffs. Tillage, the pro-
duction of crops, was the responsibility of subordinate 
sophisticated cultivation techniques. The in- ,-------- -------------- - - ------, 
F-'"--"" . -+,1 ... . -· .. traduction of ironshared ploughs, for in-
stance, had enabled deeper and more re-
peated breaking of the soil. Coupled with the 
sturdier ploughs, harrows and rollers speeded 
soil breaking, while the diffusion of seed 
drills ensured that wasteful broadcast sow-
ing became rare. Though hand methods still 
dominated the reaping process, the advent of 
scythes had superseded cutting by sickle. 
The conclusion must be that farming in the 
south eastern counties had clearly become 
more complex within Wakefield's lifetime. 
But there is little indication this was fully 
recognised. Wakefield based his theoiising 
on surface appearances, not being too con-
cerned about the subsurface nuts and bolts 
holding the structure together. 
~~· r \ 
'.) 'n,l( 
The same superficial ~ppreciatlon was 
also apparent in Wakefield's presciiption for 
the social organisation of colonial agricul-
ture. Intensive agriculture of the kind fa-
voured was dependent on heavy capital in-
vestment. To ensure that the necessary funds 
were available, an elaborate estates system 
had emerged in Biitain. Yet, with the estates 
of the south east varying greatly in layout 
and size, from under 1 000 acres to more 
The Estates Framework: layout of Wellington 
Country sections to January 1843. {Tumbull 
Library/ 
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tenant farmers, who, while renting farmlets from the 
landowner, were nevertheless themselves subject to the 
directions of his agent. At the very base of the hierarchy, 
were the agricultural labourers, who, while employed by 
the tenants. were also subject to landowner dictates. For 
the system to be successfully replicated, it was essential 
that all the component parts be transferred, and that 
preconditions exist for successful reintegration in the new 
environment. The indispensable lubricant was availabil-
ity of capital. 
It was not just British farming methods, however, nor 
indeed the underpinning social order, that Wakefield 
sought to replicate. It was also the very physical appear-
ance of the south eastern farming counties. The inher-
ently alien had to be rendered familiar. In the densely 
settled English rural landscape the estates, large and 
small, fitted together like a jigsaw. Yet each estate had 
recognised components, they being smaller jigsaws in 
themselves. At the hub was the 'home farm', replete with 
'great house'. the base of the landowner's operations. 
Where a bailiff was employed, the managerial residence 
was generally close by. Beyond this, radiating out from the 
home farm in their own complexes of fields, were the 
tenant farms, the true profit-making units. At some 
convenient point estate villages, housing the agricultural 
labourers, were situated. In its setting, the arrangement 
was tidy and functional, even if it was already being 
challenged. What was overlooked was that it was a system 
which had evolved over hundreds of years; and that it had 
been fashioned for a landscape which had been modified 
byhumanactionoveramuchlongerperiod. WhatWakefield 
urged was that in New Zealand the modification processes 
should be telescoped, and that in a few short years the 
settlement landscape be rendered as 'English-like' as 
possible. Great houses should be erected with little delay. 
The apportionment of estates into tenant farms should 
follow clearance, when properties had been rendered fully 
productive. Moreover, the passion for conversion ex-
tended to the fields themselves, it being urged these be 
stripped of indigenous vegetation and enclosed by hedge-
rows. Such modification, in Wakefield's detached view . 
should pose few problems. It was well known, he pro-
nounced, that the prospective site encompassed thou-
sands of moderately flat grassed acres, that stands of 
more substantial vegetation could be cheaply and readily 
cleared, and that the future agricultural heart of the 
settlement was served by a navigable river wholly compa-
rable to the Thames. 
That Wakefield's agrarian vision should be accepted 
unquestioningly, at least in Britain, and that it should 
continue to be given credence for a half a dozen years, even 
in the face of emerging evidence to the contrary, says 
much for the theorist's parallel skills as propagandist. It 
also reflects his backing by those with the means to 
disseminate his views. His notions were reiterated so 
frequently, so strongly. and so convincingly, as to stand as 
veri ties. The backing came in a minor flood: in books and 
journals sponsored by the Company; in so-called inde-
pendent papers (editors' willingness to publish grati~ 
contributions being much the same as today); in displays; 
and in public lectures. In all cases the sources were much 
the same : Edward, the father; Edward Gibbon, the son; 
and latterly Edward Jerningham, the grandson; all plus 
supporting cast. Little hint of disappointment, of unex-
pected surprises, was permitted to appear in type, much 
less to be broadcast from public rostrums. Yet, if embarkees 
were trusting, it would be nevertheless wrong to label 
them as gullible for accepting the intelligence that they 
were departing for 'a land blessed', indeed 'a perfect site 
for a little England across the seas'. Even official publica-
tions perpetuated the statements of those with no first 
hand knowledge of the milieu. 
THE REALITY: 'SCRATCHING AMONGST THE STUMPS' 
If the ideal was an image of 'corn-crammed parallelo-
grams, neat hedgerows and trim country seats', the reality 
was far different. By the early 1850s, despite more than a 
decade of spasmodic effort, the Wellington settlement was 
far from the model location for agricultural enterprise 
postulated. The cultivated landscape, certainly around 
Port Nicholson, rather than a neat mosaic of enclosed 
fields, was more an untidy patchwork of part cleared 
sections, bush still dominating. While a scatter of more 
sophisticated intensive farms was slowly materialising on 
the more open lands of the north west (Wanganui, 
Rangitikei ). these had been held back by the inter-racial 
conflicts of the 1840s. In the words of an 1854 visitor, the 
much vaunted agricultural districts of the settlement 
were 'a disappointment', having assumed 'a shabby North 
American' tinge. The houses were 'all wooden and any-
thing but English-like' , and their general decrepitude was 
in keeping with 'the stumps of trees in the swampy 
ground, primitive bridges and careless piled log fences'. 
No Antipodean Squirearchy had emerged. Of the l;:trger 
resident landowners who had attempted to cultivate, only 
a small rump remained, this largely reduced to grubbing 
for subsistence. Unexpectedly, the vacuum, at least par-
tially, was being filled by a cottier caste, this group opting 
for a mix of stock-raising and gardening on small family 
plots. That the plan to bank on an arable future, one 
founded on large estates, had been an abject failure was 
apparent to even the most sanguine of former Company 
apologists. 
The extent of the failure is evidenced by contemporary 
cultivation returns, i.e. returns oflands broken and sown 
(Table 1: see oven Notionally. with distribution of the 
Company lands complete, some 110,000 acres were avail-
able for tillage; far more when sales of Secondary Land 
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Table 1 
LANDS UNDER EUROPEAN CULTIVATION: 1845, 1850 & 1855 
- WELLINGTON SETTLEMENT -
1845 1850 1855 
acres % acres % acres 
Wheat 642.5 (45.0) 438 (9.5) 573 
Oats 86 (6.0) 299 (6.5) 727 
Barley 85 (6.0) 89 (1.9) 61 
Maize 3 (0.1) 9.5 
Potatoes 144.5 (10.1) 808 (17.6) 542 
Garden Crops 192 (13.5) 374 (8.1) 587.5 
Sown Grass 276.5 (19.4) 2627 (56.3) 8030.5 
Total acres cultivated 1 ,426. 5 (lOO) 4,584 (lOO) 10,530.5 
Cultivated acerage per 
head of population .33 0.77 1.3 
% 
(5.4) 
(6.9) 
(0.6) 
(0.1) 
(5.1) 
(5.6) 
(76.3) 
(lOO) 
creases in potato and garden 
crops also suggest that, 
though the short haul export 
potential of the produce 
should not be overlooked, till-
age had become more semi-
subsistence in character. 
That intensive farming 
was hemmed in, largely con-
fmed to small pockets in the 
former Company districts in 
the foundation years, is also 
attested to by the cultivation 
returns (Table 2). The initial 
focus was overwhelmingly on 
Sources: 'Blue Books' 
'--- -------------- - ------------------' the Hutt Valley, the most ex-
Orders are also taken into account. Accepting that a 
proportion of the lands sold would always have been 
unsuitable for cultivation, and that it could only be 
advanced through heavy infusions of capital and labour, 
it should nevertheless have been feasible for up to one 
quarter of the lands sold, say 27,500 acres, to have been 
broughtin within 15 years. Yet by 1855 only 10,530 acres, 
around one and one third of an acre per head of settler 
population, was recorded as being in intensive farming 
use. Even this, primafacie, represented a considerable 
advancement in a decade. Closer examination of the 
figures reveals, moreover, a fundamental transformation 
in the nature of intensive farming between 1845 and 
1855. In the former year despite five years ofbackbreaking 
effort, grain crops remained paramount in settler sowing 
strategies, collectively accounting for 57% of the sown 
acreage. Just under half the total acreage was In the 
nominated primary staple, wheat. By 1855 only 13% of the 
cultivated acreage was in grain, with wheat, at 5.4% of the 
acreage, having paled into relative insignificance. The 
actual acreage in each of the principal grain crops had 
also declined, with the exception of oats, this being in 
demand as stock feed. The 
Table2 
tensive expanse of flatland and therefore the projected 
granary of the settlement. This district continued in the 
forefront of the public imagination through the 1840s, 
although it was being challenged by 1855. In the early and 
mid -1840s, the principal ancillary agricultural districts 
were those to the south of the main town, the relatively 
open land of Watts Peninsula and the corridors leading to 
the southern coast, together with lands adjacent to the 
Porirua Road in the Near North West districts. In the latter 
case, small family farmers early established footholds. It 
was an index of early enthusiasm that a start was also 
made on the clearance of western hill slopes, particularly 
those abutting the town. With a multiplicity of difficulties 
to be faced, agricultural production barely got under way 
at the overspill settlement at Wangan ul. By the mid -1850s 
the most conspicuous advance statistically had been 
immediately to the northwest of the main town, sowings 
along the Porirua Road being augmented in the Porirua 
Basin proper. In terms of cultivated acreage, the Near 
North West and Porirua districts could claim 31.8% of the 
settlement's total by 1855, as compared to 33.8% at the 
Hutt. Almost as striking, and possibly of even greater 
moderate advance in the set-
tlement's cultivated acreage 
therefore has to be explained 
in other terms. It was largely 
accomplished through con-
verting bush and fernland, 
and much former grainland, 
into sown sward. Whereas in-
tensive livestock farming had 
been initially viewed as an 
essential adjunct to cropping, 
animal husbandry had in 
short order become an end in 
Itself in the former Company 
districts. The significant in-
LANDS UNDER EUROPEAN CULTIVATION 
BY DISTRICTS : 1845 & 1855 
Wellington Country District 
- Town & Southern Districts 
- Western Hill & West Harbour Districts 
- Hutt & East Harbour Districts 
- NNW & Porirua Districts 
Total for Wellington Country District 
Wanganui 
Rangitikei-Turakina 
Wairarapa-East Coast 
Ahurirl 
Total for Wellington Settlement 
1845 1855 
acres 
299 
146.5 
667.5 
226.5 
1339.5 
87 
1426.5 
% 
(20.9) 
(10.3) 
(46.8) 
(15.9) 
(93.9) 
(6.1) 
(lOO) 
acres 
400.5 
858 
3556 
3275 
8089.5 
1535 
504.5 
279.5 
122 
10,530.5 
Sources: 'Blue Books' 
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% 
(3.8)-
(8.1) 
(33.8) 
(31.1) 
(76.8) 
(14.6) 
(4.8) 
(2.6) 
(1.2) 
(lOO) 
long- term significance, was the increase in the Wanganui 
tilled acreage after 1849. After 15 years the signs were that 
the arable future, if there was to be one, was likely to be 
focused on Wanganui and the adjoining Rangitikei dis-
trict, even if this was still largely a matter of promise [Table 
3]. In truth, the distant north western districts had a lways 
been better suited to arable, earlier exploitation having 
been held back by the Company's inability readily to 
deliver lands to purchasers. The delay was to have further 
deleterious effects on cropping expansion. At the very time 
suitable ploughland began to become available, the re -
turns from pastoralism were already tempting farmers to 
switch from field crops to grass. 
Just why the development of arable was so faltering, 
and ultimately so unsuccessful, in the Wellington settle-
ment now has to be addressed. What is certain is that no 
s imple monocausal explanation suffices. A. combination 
of factors ensured the slow progress of intensive farming, 
in the process scuttling the Wakefieldian dream. For a 
start, the confinement of in tensive farming to a few small 
pockets was dictated by the natural environment en coun-
tered. To their dismay, settlers found that the chosen site 
was no 'smiling land', reminiscent of southern England. 
The climate may have been acceptable, even if the winds 
were bracing, but there were hills all about, in some places 
right to the harbour's edge. As one aspiring young farmer 
wrote : ' ... in whatever direction the eye fell it was on 
mountains rising in the blue distance, ridge above ridge, 
in continued succession'. There was, he recorded 'disap-
pointment on every countenance'. Even discovery that, 
beyond the harbour littorals , tracts of more moderate 
topography lay in the valleys between the ridges, some-
times promised only to deceive. The vulnerability of those 
valleys to flooding was learned only by experience. Closer 
acquaintance with the locale a lso revealed another un-
comfortable fact of life. The vegetation cover was quite 
Table3 
dissimilar to any observable in the settlers' former home-
lands, being remarkable for its density and rank luxuri-
ance. Its very thickness and matted nature more closely 
resembled the vegetation of moist tropical countries than 
the open woodlands of Canada or Australia, much less the 
modified English landscape. The natural conditions thus 
posed challenges that had to be confronted. There was no 
alternative. At the beginning settlement was necessarily 
restricted to Company lands, and, whatever that organi-
sation's claims, the only lands within its grasp, and then 
buttenuously, were t hose at the toe of the island, and later 
Wanganui. Moreover, at the toe of the island, the ranges 
proper beyond the hills provided a further natural bul-
wark. Environmental shock therefore fun ctioned as the 
first filter in separating the potentially successful from 
also-rans. 
A further factor was the identity of those shocked. 
Whether or not the particular settlers introduced might 
have been better prepared is debatable, but it is likely any 
group transported from the same source areas would have 
experienced trauma. What is certain is that the majority 
of those introduced to form an agricultural corps had but 
a meagre backgrou nd knowledge of their colonial calling, 
even in British conditions. If the Wakefieldian design was 
to be fulfilled it was imperative there be agricultural 
entrepreneu rs or capitalists (estate owners), experienced 
bailiffs or stewards (estate managers), and tenant farm-
ers/agricultural labourers (estate labour). The failure of 
the New Zealand Company adequately to recruit in any of 
these categories was to be at some substantial cost. The 
almost complete absence of former farm owners amongst 
the land purchasers was bad enough. Certainly there were 
some hopeful amateurs, but the overall grasp of farming 
practice, much less estate management, was light. Accen-
tuating the problem was the a lmost complete absence of 
land stewards. Probably such men were repelled rather 
DISTRIBUTION OF EUROPEAN CROP ACREAGES BY DISTRICTS : 1845 & 1855 
FIELD CROPS SOWN GRASS 
Wheat Other Grains Potatoes Garden 
1845 1855 1845 1855 1845 1855 1845 1855 1845 1855 
Wellington County District 
Town & Sthn District 26 31 9 4.5 1.5 73.5 145 164 245 
W.Hill & W.Harbour 82 8 16 11 7 6 26.5 57.5 15 775.5 
Hutt & E. Harbour 349 184 70 246 98 324 66 105 84.5 2697 
NNW & Porirua 134.5 12 30 74.5 23 37.5 26 167 13 2984 
Total: 591.5 204 147 340.5 132.5 369 192 474.5 276.5 6701.5 
Wanganui 51 193 24 356 12 130.5 68 787.5 
Rangitikei-Turakina 54 40 32 11 367.5 
Wairarapa -East Coast 41 31 10.5 - 25 172 
Ahurirl 8 1 30 9 2 
Sources: Wellington Provincial Gazette (1855) 
Crown Colony Statistics (1 954) 
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than attracted by the Company's notions. Estate owners, 
therefore, of necessity, had to abandon management at 
one remove and to supervise farm development on their 
own accounts, something for which most were ill-fitted. 
This created further problems when experienced former 
tenants and superior agricultural labourers were also in 
short supply. Thus, in terms of human resources, there 
were deficiencies both in quantity and quality. The pity of 
it was that British farming, as brought to Wellington, 
depended heavily on human capital for its smooth opera-
tion. Prior to departure it had been suggested that land-
owners would require 1 labourer for every 20-40 acres 
farmed (i.e. 2-3 labourers for every lOO acre section). 
Contemporary records suggest the actual requirement 
was several times that number, with seasonal labour also 
needed. But, With demand for labour also high in the first 
town, hirings were costly. At a time when experienced 
'farm servants' might expect to receive cash remuneration 
of 13/6 a week in Lincolnshire, or 10/6 per week in 
Norfolk, the first Wellington rural employers were paying 
out upwards of 18/- a week to permanent hands and 5/ 
- a day to seasonal workers. Not surprisingly, within a few 
years the ability of estate owners to maintain permanent 
staff was being seriously called into question. 
While significant modification of the terrain was im-
possible, it was nevertheless feasible to clear the land 
surface of vegetation; if with considerably more difficulty 
than suggested by Wakefield. That considerable energy 
was devoted to rendering lands suitable for farming in the 
early years of settlement is suggested by an 1847 return 
oflands cleared in the Wellington Country Districts [Table 
4A). Three distinct types of vegetation were encountered: 
swamp growth, fern , and true bush. Initially, it was the 
bushed areas that presented the greatest difficulties. At 
frrst it was believed prospective fields should be com-
pletely cut, cleared and stumped, after the British fashion 
of bringing in woodlands. With this proving prohibitively 
expensive, however, upwards of £70 per acre, aspiring 
cultivators were soon compelled to instead adopt the 
'bush-bum' system commonlyemplo~ed in North America. 
This involved axe-Wielding gangs traversing sections, cut-
ting trees three feet from the ground, or, iflesser clearance 
was acceptable, simply removing crowns. While exclu-
sively European gangs were at frrst utilised, it became 
more attractive to employ Maori as costs rose. Ideally, 
cutting work was carried through in early spring, trunks 
and branches being stacked to dry for six months before 
a match was applied. When the ashes were cool, the land 
was then considered ready for interim farming purposes. 
Clearing femland was somewhat easier, more extensive 
use being deterred by the long embraced myth that lands 
under bush were more fertile. Again, fire was extensively 
employed, the growth being first levelled with bill hooks. 
There were only limited attempts to clear swampland in 
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the first decade. That the rate of clearing slowed as the 
1840s progressed was directly related to the expense 
involved, especially when the likely returns from cultivat-
ing sank below projected outgoings. By any measure, and 
despite local adaptations, land clearance soaked up capi-
tal; although a survey of contemporary cost estimates 
suggests that outlays could vary greatly according to time 
and place [Table 4B). For the 1840s, a fair average would 
probably be around £12-£20 per acre for bush, and in 
excess of £5 per acre for the full clearance of fern. Such 
figures compared less than favourably with the £4-£5 per 
acre being contemporaneously expended on forest clear-
ance in Canada and New South Wales. But, ifthe land was 
to be utilised for the forms of farming envisaged, the costs 
had to be borne. 
Removal of the bush and fern cover did not fully relieve 
the fledgling estate owners' difficulties. At best, removal of 
the cover was only partial. Apart from the scatter of 
stumps, part burned trunks and root residuals above 
ground, the subsurface was an intricate network of roots. 
Until these were hand-grubbed, or rotted over time, the 
driving of ploughs between the stumps was hazardous, if 
not impossible. Perforce, all early cultivation had to be by 
chipping with mattock or hoe, a highly labour intensive, 
and therefore expensive, procedure. Meanwhile, imported 
agricultural implements rotted or rusted on the foreshores. 
Sowing brought further problems. Some singularly inap-
propriate locations were chosen for the frrst experiments. 
There was also uncertainty as to the best sowing times, 
British farming calendars being all that was available. 
Popular British rotations were found unsuited to the new 
environment. Actual sowing, moreover, was also far more 
costly than had been envisaged. With the use of seeddrills 
curtailed, there was a necessary reversion to the more 
Table4 
(AJ LAND CLEARANCE : 
WELLINGTON COUNTRY DISTRICTS 
Clearhig 
settlers 
1841 (1) 
Town & Southern Districts 4 
West Hill & W.Harbour 7 
Hutt & East Harbour 15 
N.N.W. & Porirua 6 
Acres 
cleared 
1847 (2) 
365 
273 
980 
364 
(1) Heaphy {1842) [2) C.C. StatiStics 
(B) LAND CLEARANCE : COST STATEMENTS 
(Samples only) 
Cost per acre 
Revans (1841) 
Heaphy (1842) 
Molesworth (1844) 
Swainson (1846) 
Marjoribanks (1846) 
Fitton (1856) 
BUSHIAND FERNI.AND 
£12 
£10-£12 £2.10.0 
£13.10.0 
£55 £12 
£20-£30 £5-£8 
£30-£40 £4-£5 
wasteful hand broadcasting. And 
there were Inexplicable failures. 
That the seeds themselves might 
be deficient was something 
brought home gradually. Some 
simply failed to take; others had 
been damaged in transit. There 
was no guarantee even with Aus-
tralian seeds. It was not until the 
mid-1840s that locally proven 
varieties became commonplace. 
There were further testing times 
once crops had taken, there being 
up to six months between sowing 
and harvesting. Heavy rains could 
wash plants from the ground on 
steeper slopes, while the risk of 
flooding was ever present on flat-
ter country. Flooding had the im-
mediate potential to smother grain 
crops, or to cause potatoes to rot 
in the ground. The effects of wind 
were also apparent, while plant diseases became endemic, 
perhaps carried in With imported seed. There were also 
hazards arising from the activities of neighbouring set-
tlers and the Maori. It was all too possible for deliberately 
lit bush fires to rage out of control, or, in the absence of 
proper fences, for crops to be destroyed by wandering 
stock. Recall that by 1844 stock numbers around the 
harbour were at bursting point. The approach of harvest-
ing, if euphoric, nevertheless gave rise to further stresses. 
Once more, the state of the fields precluded the use of 
modem techniques. It was necessary to bring In the grain 
with sickles, and to spade-dig potatoes. This Involved 
augmentation of the farm labour force for weeks at a time. 
Depending on distance from the town market, the avail-
ability of storage and the weather at harvest, there was 
also potential for post harvest wastage. The all up costs of 
cultivation are even more difficult to isolate than those for 
clearance. One Hutt farmer - Molesworth - estimated the 
cost of putting potatoes in new land as £8. 5.0 per acre, the 
comparative cost for wheat £5.12 .0 per acre; but all 
indications are that this was a gross underestimate, one 
produced for home consumption. 
Clearly then, calls on estate owners' capital were 
regular and heavy. A preliminary totting up may be 
enlightening. At the beginning, each aspiring estate owner 
had a mandatory £1 per acre land purchase price to pay 
(i.e. £100 per section). This represented no more than a 
baseline for future calls. Conservatively, the cost of clear-
ing prospective grainland could amount to £12-£20 per 
acre, even more where there were extra difficulties. The 
expense of putting in a preliminary potato crop, consid-
ered essential to prepare lands for grain, generally ex-
'The Aglionby Arms (Burchams) River Hutt': clearings in 
the bush. ['S.C. Brees Pictorial IUustrations' , London, 
1847/ 
ceeded £8 per acre. Thus, before even a bushel of seed 
went into the ground, the expense of bringing in a hypo-
thetical 100 acre parcel could involve an investment of 
£2500-£3000, with the calculation taking no account of 
expenditure on residences, fencing, plant, nor even the 
hireage of casual labour. While theoretically a proportion 
of this initial investment might be offset through sale of 
the preliminary crop, a further investment of £6 per acre 
was required before the first wheat, oats or barley could be 
harvested. If, as was common, an individual owned sev-
eral 100 acre parcels, he stood to outlay £8000-£10,000 
before the whole of his rural acreage became remunera-
tive. Here lay the rub. Such investment was beyond the 
capacity of most. Examination of early financial records 
suggests that most had funds of substantially less_than 
£5000, while, when money was available in the settle-
ment, it was at exorbitant interest rates, up to 20%. An 
inevitable conclusion is that by the mid 1840s estate 
owners were experiencing severe cash flow crises. HaVing 
invested heavily, they had exhausted the funds at their 
disposal. Yet, until the outstanding lands were broughtin, 
they were producing insufficient to cover immediate op-
erational costs, much less to cover ongoing charges. It was 
an acute dilemma, and one in which the only apparent 
way was backwards. It was also this which was to eventu-
ally lead to the pattern of semi-abandoned part clearings. 
There must be suspicion, however, that there were inap-
propriate early investment decisions, scarce funds being 
frittered away on what amounted to conspicuous con-
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sumption. While stumps in the fields might be tolerated, 
this did not necessarily mean lowered habitational hori-
zons. Depictions of estate houses suggest extensive early 
expenditure. By rumour, several of the country seats cost 
over £500. It is also recorded that one .prominent Hutt 
landowner spent as much developing the grounds sur-
rounding his homestead as he did on preparation of his 
fields. Moreover, the necessity for agricultural develop-
ment in no way lessened the demand for the flood ofluxury 
goods passing in over the settlement's wharves in the 
experimental years. 
The problems so far outlined accepted, for the favoured 
arable to have been even marginally profitable it was 
essential that there be high, preferably ever increasing, 
yields. On the basis of the first minuscule crops, some 
extravagant claims were to be made: For instance, it was 
stated in the settlement that 90 bushels of wheat per acre 
had been harvested from one Hutt farm. Returnees to 
Britain equally fallaciously claimed that 90 tons would be 
brought in from the Hutt Valley in 1842, and that three 
times that quantity could be expected in 1843 with the 
same level of inputs. Things were never that good, but 
there were prima facie grounds for initial cautious opti-
mism. About Port Nicholson wheat production peaked at 
an average 45 bushels per acre in 1845 season; a figure 
well above the average 28 bushels per acre recorded on all 
but the most efficient of British farms. Oats peaked at 65 
bushels in the following season, while potatoes consist-
ently averaged 10 tons per acre through the early 1840s. 
What settlers ignored, or did not understand, was that 
this early success was founded on the pent-up fertility of 
virgin soil. Yet what appeared a permanent state was 
easily depleted. Clearance firings, while providing potash, 
inevitably robbed the soil of some of its richness. When 
Table 5 
YIELDS IN BUSHELS PER ACRE OF 
PRINCIPAL FIELD CROPS 
WELLINGTON COUNTRY DISTRICTS 
1842- 1852 
WHEAT OATS BARLEY POTATOES 
1842 40 30 30 10 
1843 30 48 38 10 
1844 45 40 30 10 
1845 40 65 38 10 
1846 40 52 35 10 
1847 35 55 42 10 
1848 30 55 40 8 
1849 
1850 30 40 35 8 
1851 30 40 35 8 
1852 40 35 8 
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this was coupled with monocropping, both on grounds of 
the unsuitability of British rotations and the Jure of 
immediate returns , the likelihood of depletion problems 
was immense. There was little thought that to maintain 
fertility something had to be put back, or even the ability 
to do much about it. The inadequacies of the cultivation 
methods applied to the colonial soil were all too soon 
evident. From the mid 1840s the trend was inexorably 
downwards [Table 5]. The decline in yields was a crushing 
blow. In the most favourable of circumstances it would 
have been imperative that peak early yield levels be at 
least maintained. When this proved impossible, the raison 
d'etre for large grain farms was effectively removed. 
Yet, even if the early yield levels had been maintained, 
another debilitating reality would have had to have been 
faced. Irrespective of theory, there was very little demand 
for Wellington produce, particularly grain; or not at the 
prices expected by producers. Despite the heralding of the 
settlement as 'the granary of the Pacific', supplier of its 
own wants, supplier of the Australian colonies, and, 
ultimately, exporter of bread grains to Britain, adverse 
cost structures precluded full assumption of any of these 
roles. Failure to command the home market was most 
immediately damaging. In the early 1840s a bushel of 
wheat might entail an expenditure of upwards of 3/- to 
produce from sowing to harvesting. To this had to be 
added cartage costs to the settlement hub, often upwards 
of 1/- bushel. Overheads on land purchases, clearance 
and improvement then had to be taken into consideration. 
When the product was fetching only 5/- to 10/- a bushel 
at the harbour township, with brokers · fees to be paid, 
there was little margin for error. But errors there were, 
crop failures being commonplace in the experimental 
phase. 
It was at this point that competitors stepped profitably 
into the void. In the early and mid-1840s the effect of 
Maori competition was devastating. With few overheads, 
able to transport produce themselves, the Maoris pro-
vided grain to the wholesale merchants at rates consider-
ably less than the settlers' actual on-farm costs. There 
was also increasing pressure from 'foreign' producers as 
the 1840s progressed. While it had been postulated that 
Wellington would supply the Australian colonies, the 
reverse in fact occurred. By the mid-1840s good quality 
grain could be sourced from New South Wales and Van 
Diemens Land at little more than 4/- and 3/- a bushel 
respectively. The costofshipmentfromAustralian wharves 
to the settlement was substantially less than the convey-
ance of similar quantities from farms just a few miles 
distant. It was even possible to import grain from Chile at 
around 2/- per bushel base price. In the face of such 
competition, local capitalist producers were simply un-
able to establish firm market footholds. And, beyond 
reliability of supply, there was also the question of quality 
ofproduct,local grain being generally condemned as 'poor 
stuff. as was that from Nelson. Even then settlement 
bakers were mixing local flour with imported grindings. 
Given. the inability of estate owners to compete In the 
local market, the Intent that grains constitute an export 
staple was never more than an idle dream. Even If quality 
crops had been available, at competitive prices, it is likely 
trade would have been constrained by the inability of 
merchants to guarantee shipping tonnage at acceptable 
costs. Until January 1850 the British Navigation Acts 
confined carriage to ships of British registry. It was one of 
the irritants of the 1840s that there was no scheduled 
packet service to Wellington. Crops could have waited 
months in warehouses, vulnerable to deterioration or pest 
attacks. Moreover, even if immediately loaded, there was 
little likelihood of expeditious conveyance to the British 
market, charter vessels habitually calling at Australian 
and more exotic ports. There was thus the further pros-
pect of spoilage in the course oflong overseas voyages. The 
cost of such voyages further raised the endcost of the 
product, grain being a low value commodity relative to 
weight. To local on-wharf costs had to be added a further 
premium of around £6 per ton, with disposal costs also 
having to be met a t destination. There was thus little 
prospect of more than part costs being recouped. To cap 
things off, while British grain prices fluctuated In the 
1840s, there was a general trend downwards following the 
mid-decade repeal of the Corn Laws. The result was that, 
with the exception of a few speculative cargoes, carefully 
selected for demonstration effect rather than with profit 
margins in mind, the lack of export potential was soon 
acknowledged. 
In the face of such a catalogue of adversities, that the 
vision of an intensive arable future rapidly withered 
should not surprise. By the early 1850s not a single estate 
survived, save in vestigial form. A number had been 
abandoned, others reduced greatly in size, and yet others 
parcelled out, for sale or lease, in sections of a size 
considered attractive to settlers of limited means. Where 
intensive agriculture was still practised, it bore little 
resemblance to the cultivation forms at first envisaged. 
Much of the acreage laboriously prepared for grain had 
been converted to grass and, where cropping persisted, 
the crop mix had drastically altered. Potatoes and garden 
crops now held greater attraction than grain. These were 
scarcely the foundations upon which an Antipodean Squire-
archy could be built. The majority of the estate families 
decamped. 
For some the removal was temporary, until conditions 
improved or until new strategies had been devised, but for 
others the break was total. Of the latter, several sold up, 
returning defeated to Britain. Others resumed residence 
in the main town, turning their attention to other ways of 
making a profit. A few, an enterprising few, immediately 
altered their personal success strategies, seeking new 
lands, and fortunes by other means, In the outdistricts of 
the settlement. (In other words, the graziers discussed in 
the earlier paper). 
Those remaining, largely resigned themselves to grow-
ing their own food, and to producing just sufficient to 
exchange for household necessities. Needless to say, the 
English-style landscape was not created. Indeed, by the 
late 1840s there was an obsession with the apparent 
desolation of the formerly favoured agricultural districts. 
By an 'enormous and almost incredible expenditure of 
labour and money', to use one settler's words, tall trees 
had been felled and extensive patches denuded of vegeta-
tion - but for what? To now critical eyes the 'charred 
stumps In all directions' were considered 'a great eyesore'. 
Far from the delight initially expressed at the rigours of 
the pioneering life, there was now fastidious distaste for a 
life spent 'scratching amongst the stumps'. Yet, however, 
distasteful the scene to gentle sensitivities, the virtual 
abandonment of the first agricultural districts by major 
capitalists represented opportunity for lesser settlers. 
WELLINGTON'S EARLY AGRICULTURAL CAPITALISTS: 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CASE- STUDIES 
The present paper has been principally concerned with 
the presentation of what might be termed the 'systematics' 
of pioneer arable farming. There has been an attempt to 
provide explanations of why the promotion of arable was 
faltering In the Wellington settlement; and of why the 
switch to pastoralism by the settlements'leading capital-
ists was inevitable. What has been lacking so far is people. 
Yet in the larger study of which this paper forms part, 
there has been every endeavour to provide a human face , 
or rather faces. This stems from a firm conviction that, as 
D.W. Meinig has written, 'ultimately, all generalisations 
must be grounded on what actually happened when a 
particula r group of people colonised a particular part of 
the earth, in a particular ma nner, at a particular time'. In 
a community as small as 1840s Wellington it is particu-
larly important not to lose sight of individuals, their ideas, 
their experiences, not least their foibles. Hen ce analysis 
based on extant contemporary statistics, returns and 
reports has been consistently supplemented by the exten-
sive compilation of representative case-studies. It is thus 
possible to amplify. some times qualify, more general 
fmdings . At the very least, the case-studies afford a 
valuable verification mechanism. 
The Hutt Valley, for instance, was indisputably the 
principal projected grain growing area, although this 
designation was on the basis of but fleeting resource 
evaluations. Throughout the 1840s the Hutt was extolled 
as 'a very fertile district', one of 'incredible beauty', even in 
the face of difficulties. It took unprejudiced eyes, in this 
case those of visiting naval officer RE. Malone, to discern 
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that the Hutt was 'anything but pretty or interesting in 
appearance, except to the easily pleased minds of the 
Wellington people who appear to think it Paradise'. He 
complained that he had been subjected to a cacophony of 
'"Be sure you go to the Hutt"- "Oh, you must see the Hutt" 
- "So English-like"'. To Malone's mind, this was 'truly 
ridiculous when alluding to a partly drained, sparsely 
populated swamp'. 
To test the relative accuracy of these apparently con-
flicting statements the development of estates agriculture 
in the district has been reconstructed, both using Com-
pany land records, other semi-official documents and 
newspapers, and by the assemblage of short histories of 
representative properties from surviVing private papers. 
The findings from the first sources have already largely 
been laid out. They form the kernel of the present paper. 
The only additional finding is that estates farming was 
confined to a select few. Despite 80 sections being pre-
sented in the Lower Valley, no more than six were occupied 
as estates at 1845. A further four had been briefly occu-
pied between 1841 and 1845. A second set of findings, on 
the basis of the case-studies, is that, while there were 
many common points, there was no one overall estates 
farming experience at the Hutt. Individual responses 
varied, according to the backgrounds, aptitudes and very 
characters of those involved; as well, of course, as the 
natural endowments of sections occupied. This can be 
demonstrated by focusing on the efforts of four settlers. 
T. !HASON 
II.W. l'ETRE 
LOCATION OF REPRESENTATIVE 
LOWER HUTT VALLEY EST,\TES 
AT 1843 
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Though scarcely scientifically selected, the chosen 
quartet of Hurt farmers (F.A. Molesworth, Hon. H.W. 
Petre, William Swainson, Thomas Mason) constitutes a 
reasonably representative sample of the agricultural capi-
talists. Two, Molesworth and Petre, were genuinely aristo-
cratic, while Swainson was from the minor gentry. Mason, 
a Quaker, was representative of new urban money. In 
terms of age, Molesworth, Petre and Mason were all in 
their early 20s, Swainson being 52 on arrival. Prior 
colonial experience was restricted to Petre and Swainson, 
though in the case of the former it was short, in the latter 
confined to a naturalist's wanderings in South America. 
Not one had first hand farming experience, though all 
shared Swainson's conviction that "'he Agricultural pro-
fession was not incompatible with the status of Gentle-
man'. They also all embarked with the intention of making 
colonial fortunes through the cultivation of grain. In 
working their properties, these being spread through the 
Lower Valley [Fig.5], each experienced, to greater or lesser 
degree, the vicissitudes earlier outlined : clearance diffi-
culties, cultivation problems, the threat of natural haz-
ards. In the case of Swainson and Mason there was the 
added tension of conflict with the Maori. 
While detailed comparison of the quartet's efforts is 
informative, the prime interest lies in the end results. 
Although Molesworth's was the Company's 'model farm' . 
being shown off to all who visited the settlement, there 
must be suspicion its prospects were never as rosy as 
claimed. Regardless of its owner's ceaseless toil, by the 
mid-l840s there were heavy operating losses. Following 
Molesworth's death, the result of a tree-felling accident, 
the property was subdivided and sold off in five parts by 
his executors, much of the land being converted to graz-
ing. Petre was never likely to make a success of estates 
farming. Indeed, although he occupied sections, or part 
sections, for 13 years, he only seriously cultivated for two 
seasons, recording heavy losses in both. It seems more 
likely he was always more interested in his blood race-
horses and imported pheasants. Certainly, an allowance 
from his family apart, his bread came not from his fields 
but from service as a public official. Swainson, though far 
more committed, actually cultivated little longer than 
Petre. Less than two years after taking up land he was 
deliberately scaling down his operations, stating his in-
tention to do no more than grow his own food. 'Enormous 
outlay and great risks' would thus be avoided. Neverthe-
less, while withdrawing from attempted commercial pro-
Left: Figure 5. Location of representative Lower Hutt Valley 
estates at 1843. 
Opposite above: 'Residence of Wm Swainson Esqr. at the 
Hutt'. Swainson's Hawkshead Farm. ['S.C. Brees Pictorial 
lllustrations', London, 1847/ 
Opposite below: Figure6. Mod!fiedcapitalistintensivefanning 
enterprises at 1845-46. · 
duction, Swainson continued to ponder, and pontificate, 
throughout the 1840s. It was to little effect. By the early 
1850s, practically destitute, he was claiming that New 
Zealand had been 'near fatal' to him. His holding had been 
reduced to a mere nine acres. And, finally, Mason. After 
battling through the early 1840s, anticipating an out-
break ofinter-racihl hostilities, he gathered his family and 
took ship for Van Diemen's Land in 1845. He was to 
remain there for six years. The general findings are thus 
reinforced. Not one of the four successfully surmounted 
the adversities of the 1840s. Not one succeeded in making 
an arable fortune. What the case-studies suggest is that 
there were several routes to the same destination. What 
the case-studies also suggest is that, in their own ways, 
both promoters of the Hutt and the acerbic Malone may 
have been right. Utopian views of the Hutt probably date 
from the heady establishment years, before the enormity 
ofthe problems to be confronted was realised. Later there 
was reluctance to accept the 
dream was unsustainable. By 
the time ofMalone's 1854 visit, 
however, the evidence of col-
lapse was clearly to be seen. 
From the failure to estab-
lish grain estates beyond the 
Hutt it cannot be concluded 
that there was little other capi-
talistic agricultural endeavour 
prior to 1855. Once the initial 
traumas induced by transpor-
tation to the alien environment 
.... -'\ ~~ .--~" 
~ 
. 
the 1840s witnessed the emergence 
of more modest forms of capitalist 
Intensive farming in the settlement. 
Taking advantage of unforested 
lands close to Its urban nucleus, 
several enterprising individuals set 
up 'dairy stations', intensive live-
stock units bearing little resem-
blance to the extensive runs of the 
outdistricts. For them, butter, rather 
than corn, was to be the key to the 
future. In a category slightly apart 
was a small corps of 'gentleman 
farmers', generally prominent set-
tlers. often with other means of 
support, who, while prepared to 
invest capital in the development of their properties, were 
less dependent on immediate returns. In their case the 
goal became self-sufficiency plus a little extra, full exploi-
tation of their lands being deferred. Altogether records for 
eight alternative capitalist properties have been located, 
three having been selected as representative: Smith and 
Revans' Evans Bay dairy station; Judge H.S. Chapman's 
'Homewood' (Karori) property; and J.C. Crawford's 
'Glendavar' (Miramar) farm [Fig.6]. 
Smith and Revans' dairy station, one of the first 
alternative capitalist ventures, was established in late 
1841. As the latter wrote, intimating his intention to 
forswear corn, he had 'other fish to fry- in the form of cows 
and milk' As much as 5/- lb. had been locally paid for 
butter, and at least 3 /6lb. could be confidently expected. 
For several years it appeared that the decision had been 
a shrewd one. Within 12 months the original 22 head of 
cattle imported had been boosted to a herd of more than 
had been overcome, those stay-
ingwere compelled to re-evalu-
ate their surroundings. If the 
available lands were unsuit-
able for commercial grain 
farms, their true potential had 
to be assessed. Sheep apart, 
SMITH ANU REVANS' 
EVANS IIAY DAIRY STATION MODIFIED CAPITALIST INTENSIVE 
FARMING ENTERPRISES 
nt 1845·46 
·~ 
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l 00. In 1843 and 1844 the still growing herd spread on to 
adjacent rented lands. But the partners, particularly 
Revans, overstretched themselves. By mid-decade trou-
bles were looming. Although these were partly attribut-
able to other shaky business deals, the difficulty was that 
the partners had employed credits to purchase cattle at 
speculative prices. Combined with heavy investments in 
plant, and even heavier outlays on renting additional 
lands, the costs were simply too high. When stock prices 
fell, the outcome of increased livestock shipments from 
the Australian colonies, and when the emergence of 
competitors reduced the returns from dairy and associ-
ated products, they were unable to meet the interest 
bills on their debts. By mid 1845 Revans was in Court, 
the debts of the partnership exceeding£4000. By doubt-
ful manoeuvres Revans was able to sidestep severe 
sanctions, but his attention turned firmly to Wairarapa 
flocks. 
If Revans' enterprise was brought down by his specu-
lative inclinations, there was never any such danger in 
Judge Chapman's farm building efforts. Between 1844 
and 1850 he meticulously brought in his lOO acre 'gentle-
man farm', proceeding sedately, further investing only as 
his resources permitted. It too came to be regarded as a 
model property, one commented upon and visited by 
dignitaries through the later 1840s. It was hailed as a 
practical expression of Cobbett's 'cottage economy' prin-
ciples. Almost certainly 'Homewood' was conceived as a 
farm that would eventually switch to a fully commercial 
production basis, but the reassurance for such as Chap man 
was that, if premature disposal became necessary, hand-
some returns from capital gains might be expected. Yet, in 
finalising his accounts prior to quitting the settlement in 
1851, Chapman was to be disappointed. He identified 
losses in the order of 33% on expended capital over seven 
years. In the vicinity of £1200 had been outlayed on 
development. Against this had to be offset between £250-
£300, the savings from self sufficiency in food, rent, and 
small profits from the sale of surplus stock. The only offer 
forthcoming, however, was £550, this leaving a deficit of 
£350-£400. 
The final alternative capitalist property, Crawford's 
'Glendavar', is harder to classify. Much bigger than either 
of those previously cited, it was neither a true gentleman 
farm nor an intensive livestock unit; nor was there any 
attempt to grow grain within its boundaries. Yet in con-
cept it was probably nearer the estate ideal than any other 
property. Having earlier secured a foothold on Watt's 
Peninsular (Miramar). Crawford floated an ambitious 
mid-l840s plan to cut the whole ofit up into tenant farms. 
It was envisaged that more than 40 such tenancies might 
be so created, the occupiers specialising in dairy stock, 
gardening and poultry. The plan was in three parts. The 
first was land improvement, the central valley of the 
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Peninsula being dominated by a lake and swamps. The 
second was the consolidation of Peninsula land holdings, 
thereby ensuring maximum return from land improve-
ment investments. If these two steps were successfully 
carried through, the third, apportionment, followed logi-
cally. In 1846-47 over £3000 was outlayed on improve-
ments, the most notable feature being drainage ofBurnham 
Water. It soon became clear, however, that consolidation 
would be impossible, at least in the short term. To be sure, 
there had been a promising start, six southerly sections 
being acquired from the Molesworth estate, but three 
critical central sections continued to elude the erstwhile 
subdivider. One, integral to complete success of the 
drainage works, stood in the name of the Rev. Vesey Hine, 
and the British cleric obstinately clung to the conviction 
that it would be the site of future docks. The other two had 
fallen to EdwardJerningham Wakefield, the son of Gibbon 
being adamant that he could not be expected to 'part with 
a lottery ticket which may someday turn up a prize'. 
Chagrined at his inability to progress, Crawford departed 
for New South Wales. By estimate he had already spent 
well over £5000 on Glendavar. Yet in an 1849 letter he 
instructed his agent to accept£2500, if that could be got, 
with his town acres thrown in as a bonus. 'What is to be 
done with this castrated and hum bugged estate', he 
wrote, 'God knows, for I am sure I do not'. 
The lesson from the last three case-studies is this : 
even the promotion of more modest forms of capitalist 
intensive farming was fraught with difficulties, and there 
was little prospect of handsome profits. It is therefore 
possible to concur with Lieutenant T.B. Collinson R.E. 
who, describing what he had seen, wrote home in early 
1848 that 'despite much hoo-ha .. . the result of all the 
Great Agricultural Experiments, from which a great deal 
had been expected, was that the labouring man, he who 
puts his own hand to the plough, could make a living ... 
but the Gentlemen could not'. 'No gentlemen', he contin-
ued, had 'succeeded in anything save beggaring them-
selves'. Yet, as earlier suggested, the failure of the larger 
intensive farming capitalists provided opportunities f~r 
others. That small farming, tolerated by the Company but 
largely dismissed as of any great economic significance, 
should have so quickly emerged as the real alternative to 
the preferred forms of intensive agriculture, the true 
counterpoint to grazing In the outdistricts, owed much, of 
course, to the peculiar circumstances of the Wellington 
settlement. But discussion of how the small farmers 
responded to their challenge is properly the subject of 
another paper. 
The material in this article was presented in a Stout 
Research Centre Seminar on 15 Aprill992 and willform 
part of a forthcoming publication in which detailed refer-
ences will be given. 
